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Co-Chair, Co-Producer? Developmental Pluralism in Indonesia's GPEDC Leadership, 2023–2025

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Abstract: A state's visibility as a multilateral co-chair does not by itself establish authorship of collective policy decisions. This article asks how Indonesia's leadership in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) during 2023–2025 reproduced or shaped pluralist and solidarist practices, and which outputs can be linked to identifiable Indonesian initiatives. Using an embedded qualitative case study, we compare GPEDC terms of reference, work programmes, steering-committee summaries, co-chair submissions to the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, the Sevilla outcome and Indonesia's monitoring results. Documents were selected for their institutional authority, event dates, attributable interventions and availability of before-and-after texts. The record identifies Indonesian facilitation of committee debates and specific 2024 proposals on South–South knowledge exchange, aid commitments and GPEDC funding transparency. However, several agendas predated those interventions, and collective co-chair submissions cannot establish individual drafting credit. The Sevilla outcome partly recognises GPEDC's relevance but stops short of the co-chairs' stronger follow-up proposal. Indonesia's monitoring data likewise document a coexistence of national ownership and uneven partner-system use, not a demonstrable motive to resist accountability. The article conceptualises developmental pluralism as this observable combination of sovereign policy space, voluntary cooperation and limited collective accountability. It distinguishes participation, proposal, institutional uptake and implementation rather than treating institutional leadership as proof of unilateral norm creation.

Keywords: English School, pluralism and solidarism, GPEDC, Indonesia, development effectiveness, institutional co-production.

Abstrak: Visibilitas sebuah negara sebagai ketua bersama multilateral tidak dengan sendirinya menetapkan kepemimpinan keputusan kebijakan kolektif. Artikel ini menanyakan bagaimana kepemimpinan Indonesia dalam Kemitraan Global untuk Kerja Sama Pembangunan Efektif (GPEDC) selama 2023–2025 mereproduksi atau membentuk praktik pluralis dan solidaris, serta hasil mana yang dapat dikaitkan dengan inisiatif Indonesia yang dapat diidentifikasi. Dengan menggunakan studi kasus kualitatif yang tertanam, kami membandingkan kerangka acuan GPEDC, program kerja, ringkasan komite pengarah, pengajuan bersama untuk Konferensi Internasional Keempat tentang Pembiayaan untuk Pembangunan, hasil Sevilla, dan hasil pemantauan Indonesia. Dokumen dipilih berdasarkan otoritas kelembagaan, tanggal acara, intervensi yang dapat diatribusikan, dan ketersediaan teks sebelum dan sesudah. Catatan tersebut mengidentifikasi fasilitasi debat komite Indonesia dan proposal spesifik 2024 tentang pertukaran pengetahuan Selatan–Selatan, komitmen bantuan, dan transparansi pendanaan GPEDC. Namun, beberapa agenda sudah ada sebelum intervensi tersebut, dan pengajuan kolektif dari co-chair tidak dapat menetapkan kredit penyusunan individu. Hasil Sevilla sebagian mengakui relevansi GPEDC tetapi tidak sampai pada usulan tindak lanjut yang lebih kuat dari co-chair. Data pemantauan Indonesia juga mendokumentasikan keberadaan kepemilikan nasional dan penggunaan sistem mitra yang tidak merata, bukan motif yang dapat dibuktikan untuk menolak akuntabilitas. Artikel ini mengkonseptualisasikan pluralisme pembangunan sebagai kombinasi yang dapat diamati antara ruang kebijakan berdaulat, kerja sama sukarela, dan akuntabilitas kolektif yang terbatas. Artikel ini membedakan partisipasi, proposal, adopsi dan pelaksanaan institusional daripada memperlakukan kepemimpinan institusional sebagai bukti penciptaan norma sepihak.

Kata Kunci: Sekolah Bahasa Inggris, pluralisme dan solidarisme, GPEDC, Indonesia, efektivitas pembangunan, koproduksi institusional.

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Introduction

An international institution can acknowledge a state's leadership without attributing its collective decisions to that state. This distinction is particularly consequential for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC). Under its co-chair arrangement, Indonesia took part in convening stakeholders, discussing monitoring practices and negotiating global development-effectiveness language. Yet the GPEDC Steering Committee, not any single co-chair, is the principal decision-making body (GPEDC 2024d, 2). Indonesia's visible participation therefore raises a question of institutional authorship: did it simply help reproduce agreed procedures, introduce specific proposals, or demonstrably change collective rules? These possibilities imply different degrees of diplomatic agency and require different documentary tests.

The GPEDC grew from the Busan development-effectiveness agenda and operates through four principles: country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency with mutual accountability. Its architecture combines country-led monitoring with internationally negotiated standards and participation by states and non-state actors (GPEDC 2023a; GPEDC 2024a). Rather than functioning as a treaty regime imposing generally binding sanctions, the partnership organises assessments, consultations and political dialogue. Such arrangements may make policy expectations visible while leaving considerable discretion over their implementation. An accepted monitoring procedure and an implemented accountability commitment are therefore analytically distinct outcomes. Treating them as synonymous risks overstating what voluntarist institutions actually produce.

Indonesia is an instructive case because it occupies a dual position in development cooperation: it receives cooperation while also supplying knowledge and assistance to partners, including through South–South and triangular initiatives. The OECD profile describes this combination and the institutionalisation of Indonesian AID (OECD 2025). The GPEDC assigned Indonesia a constituency role encompassing countries with provider-and-recipient characteristics; the terms of reference specify responsibilities that existed before the events examined here (GPEDC 2024d, 5–7). Bappenas officials participated in steering meetings during the 2023–2026 work programme, while the present study restricts its observed decisions and actions to 2023–2025. This distinction between the programme's formal span and the article's empirical window prevents later plans from being reported as achievements inside the case period.

Existing research offers reasons to question a simple leadership-success narrative. Eyben and Savage (2013) examine how categories of development actors were constructed and contested in the Busan negotiations. Taggart (2022) asks whether global development partnerships achieve legitimacy through broader participation or reproduce unequal power relations. Haug and Taggart (2024) foreground fragmented accountability in a development-governance complex containing multiple actors and institutional venues. Gisselquist, Justino and Vaccaro (2024) call attention to conceptual and measurement problems in assessing development-effectiveness principles. Reinsberg and Westerwinter (2021) further document the expansion of multistakeholder arrangements in international development. Together, these studies show why cooperation principles, monitoring data and additional stakeholders do not establish stronger obligations or development outcomes by themselves.

A further analytical difficulty concerns the word 'co-producer' in descriptions of international institutional leadership. Co-production can refer to participating in joint discussion, contributing a proposal, jointly sponsoring a draft or shaping a finally authorised provision. These are not interchangeable achievements. In a multistakeholder organisation, institutional authority may be distributed across co-chairs, a steering body, a support team and member constituencies. A study that wishes to identify an individual state's contribution must therefore preserve the level of agency attached to every document. This article treats attribution as an empirical result to be established, rather than a celebratory synonym for high-level participation.

The study also draws on scholarship about Indonesia and diplomatic leadership without presuming that such scholarship has already settled the GPEDC attribution question. Fachry and Heryadi (2019) locate GPEDC within discussion of Indonesian development-related foreign policy; wider work on South–South cooperation complicates a fixed donor-recipient divide (Mawdsley 2017). Tallberg (2010) distinguishes the powers available to institutional chairs from the bargaining results that emerge among participants. These conversations help identify a narrower empirical gap than the untestable claim that Indonesia's GPEDC role has never been studied: the relationship between traceable Indonesian interventions, the collective drafting process and the actual content of institutional decisions remains insufficiently resolved in the material examined here.

The English School provides the conceptual basis for interpreting that relationship. For Bull (1977) and Buzan (2004), international society operates through shared rules and institutions even when members retain sovereign autonomy. The pluralist-solidarist spectrum distinguishes relatively thin duties of coexistence and independence from thicker expectations of common responsibility. Buzan's distinction between primary institutions, such as sovereignty and diplomacy, and secondary institutions, such as formal international organisations and regimes, helps show how an institution can reproduce a rule without necessarily intensifying it. Applied to the GPEDC, country ownership, stakeholder participation and mutual accountability must be examined as differently specified practices rather than automatically coded as evidence of either pole.

The central puzzle emerges when two records are read together. GPEDC documents show Indonesian officials advancing concrete proposals on South–South engagement, resource mobilisation and the wording of assistance commitments.

At the same time, several apparently similar outcomes originated in earlier joint work programmes, while major FfD4 texts were submitted by co-chairs acting collectively. The analysis therefore asks: How did Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship in 2023–2025 reproduce and shape pluralist and solidarist development-cooperation practices, and to what extent can identifiable institutional outputs be attributed to Indonesian initiatives rather than collective or inherited agendas? The question targets institutional practices and documentary attribution, not an unobserved psychological motivation to evade scrutiny.

The article makes a bounded contribution. It reconstructs a sequence from prior mandate through Indonesian interventions, subsequent collective deliberation, text proposals and recorded decisions. It then uses that sequence to distinguish procedural participation from substantive co-production and to assess the term developmental pluralism. Here, the term denotes an observable configuration in which sovereign decision space coexists with voluntary monitoring, inclusive consultation and accountability ambitions whose binding force remains limited. It is an interpretation assessed against contrary evidence, not a claim that Indonesian officials consciously adopted a named strategy. The following sections describe a transparent documentary method, present the chronological record, and then assess its implications for institutional agency and the English School.

Method

This study uses a qualitative embedded single-case design focused on Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship. The outer case is the GPEDC's multistakeholder governance setting; the embedded episodes are (1) work-programme and Steering Committee activity during 2023–2024, (2) GPEDC participation in the 2024–2025 Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) negotiations, and (3) the proposal for a fifth monitoring round in 2025. A final country-level episode records Indonesia's monitoring and action dialogue without treating domestic indicator values as committee decisions. The analytical unit is not a meeting as a whole but an identifiable document, proposal, statement, drafting change, committee response or recorded implementation status.

Document Selection and Evidence Hierarchy

The documentary corpus comprises the institutional documents and country reports listed in the references. Inclusion required an identifiable issuing institution, relevant event or reporting period, and content directly bearing on Indonesia's role, GPEDC norms, collective decisions or a proposed institutional change. Priority was given to terms of reference, work programmes, the summaries of Steering Committee meetings 26–30, the 2025–2026 Action Plan, written co-chair responses to FfD4 drafts, the letter of 20 May 2025, and the 16 June 2025 Sevilla outcome. Indonesia's 2024 country results brief and the 2025 action-dialogue account supply a distinct country-level evidence stream. Newspaper-like announcements and retrospective institutional summaries provide context but cannot substitute for signed inputs or deliberative records.

The evidence hierarchy is designed to constrain attribution. A signed or otherwise actor-attributed proposal can establish that an actor advanced a position; it cannot alone establish adoption. Dated minutes can identify participation, moderation, reactions and committee decisions; they do not normally reveal unrecorded bargaining. Successive drafts and a final outcome can establish textual continuity, deletion or narrowing; similarity by itself does not identify the author who caused the change. An official press release establishes that an event was announced or convened, but claims about effects require a separate record. A later document describing a 2025 meeting is used retrospectively and is not presented as information necessarily available to participants during that meeting.

Concepts, Indicators and Coding

The coding procedure distinguishes an item's evidentiary status from the interpretation eventually attached to it. Statements are logged chronologically as proposals, reports, rules, decisions or retrospective assessments. Their dates are cross-checked against the relevant institutional phase, particularly where minutes were published months after the meeting they describe. The resulting observations are then assigned to the concepts of decision space, shared obligation and institutional agency. Finally, each interpretive claim is compared with available earlier or later documents and downgraded if the link between actor, content and outcome is not documented. This sequence is a method of transparent classification, not a claim to possess a full private negotiation archive.

Pluralist practice is operationalised as documented protection of national decision space, voluntary participation, limited decision delegation and the absence of enforceable country-level obligations. Solidarist practice is operationalised as documented shared reporting duties, authorised stakeholder participation, measurable collective commitments, transparency provisions and review procedures applicable beyond individual national discretion. These are dimensions of a spectrum, not mutually exclusive country labels. A high planning score alone is not evidence that Indonesia resisted oversight, and the mere attendance of a civil-society actor is not proof of an enforceable solidarist commitment. Each observation is coded according to the rule or behaviour actually documented and its institutional authority (Bull 1977; Buzan 2004).

For leadership and co-production, six documentary categories are distinguished: an existing inherited agenda; an individually attributable Indonesian proposal; Indonesian moderation or facilitation; a jointly authored co-chair proposal; an agreed collective committee or intergovernmental text; and an outcome with implementation confirmed during the case period. A coding record therefore contains the event date, issuing institution, speaker or signatory where identifiable, precise proposed language or action, earlier related text, reported deliberative response, final decision and evidentiary limit. Negative

observations, such as the absence of an adopted funding-transparency mechanism in the available Action Plan, are recorded as 'not established by this corpus' rather than treated as proof that every possible negotiation failed.

Five tests organise the documentary process trace. First, a pre-intervention baseline checks whether the alleged initiative was already part of the programme. Second, an attributable intervention identifies the specific Indonesian action, wording or proposed instrument. Third, an intermediate record seeks a deliberative response or draft change connected to that intervention. Fourth, a before-and-after comparison identifies whether the proposed content survived, changed or disappeared from the collective text. Fifth, where the time window permits, an implementation record distinguishes an agreed plan from realised practice. These tests follow the logic that evidence for a sequence is not automatically evidence for the causal mechanism proposed to explain it (Collier 2011; Mahoney 2012; Beach and Pedersen 2019).

The inquiry assesses two non-exclusive interpretations alongside direct individual influence. Institutional continuity predicts that existing GPEDC programmes would continue through successive committees regardless of who moderated them. Collective bargaining predicts that multiple co-chairs, constituent groups and UN negotiators would shape final language in ways that cannot be assigned to a single participant. These interpretations are considered against the same documents, rather than introduced as competing formal theoretical frameworks. For each episode, a claim of exclusively Indonesian norm creation requires a trace stronger than event attendance, subsequent similarity or co-signature; where that trace is unavailable, the final interpretation is narrowed accordingly.

No interviews, survey data or privately held version histories are claimed. The analysis is restricted to the documentary passages and publication summaries actually examined, rather than claiming access to complete institutional archives or all full-text academic works. Consequently, the method supports reconstruction of published events and cautious textual comparisons but not a definitive account of confidential drafting negotiations. GPEDC country monitoring indicators retain the original observation year, reporting unit and denominator; they are used to describe the institutional setting, not as causal estimates of Indonesia's co-chairmanship or population-level welfare effects. All source-access restrictions constrain the corresponding claims in the Results, Discussion and Conclusion.

Results and Discussion

Results

The results proceed from inherited institutional authority to Indonesian interventions and collective outcomes. This order matters because a later decision cannot establish a co-chair's originality without an earlier baseline. It also keeps the GPEDC's transnational agenda separate from country-level monitoring results, which measure different actors, years and units.

Inherited Mandates and Early Indonesian Facilitation

The GPEDC terms of reference locate primary decision-making authority in the Steering Committee and allocate representation and coordination responsibilities to the co-chairs (GPEDC 2024d, 2, 5–7). The 2023–2026 work programme, agreed before the interventions discussed below, already included monitoring, evidence use, country-level dialogue and engagement with academic and other non-state participants (GPEDC 2023a). It also gave Indonesia relevant dual-role and regional outreach responsibilities. Hence, subsequent Indonesian activity within these work streams documents the exercise of an existing mandate. The temporal baseline does not support attributing the programme's creation to Indonesia's 2024 proposals.

Indonesia hosted a national high-level kick-off for the monitoring process on 16 August 2023, subsequently reported by GPEDC in September (GPEDC 2023c). At the 26th Steering Committee meeting on 4 December 2023, Bappenas representative Bogat Widyatmoko called attention to the communication of monitoring benefits and broader engagement, while Hendra Wahanu Prabandani moderated the behaviour-change and uptake discussion (GPEDC 2023b, 2–4). These are specifically documented acts of mobilisation and facilitation. The source record does not identify an enacted new monitoring rule produced by the meeting, so 'institutional entrepreneurship' in this episode means making an agreed mechanism operationally visible rather than founding it.

Bappenas also associated development cooperation with South–South knowledge exchange before the mid-2024 Steering Committee interventions. Its 16 January 2024 public communication discussed research partnerships and triangular-cooperation priorities (Bappenas 2024). The Bali High-Level Forum on Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships of 1–3 September 2024 later offered another setting for convening and monitoring-related engagement (GPEDC 2024f). This chronology demonstrates continuity of the topic across Indonesian domestic diplomacy and GPEDC settings, but the sources do not show which participants changed specific GPEDC commitments during the forum.

Attributed Proposals at the 27th Steering Committee

The summary of the 27th Steering Committee meeting, held on 12–13 June 2024, provides unusually clear actor attribution. Hendra Prabandani suggested linking academic expertise with South–South cooperation providers and revisiting earlier Geneva commitments (GPEDC 2024b, 2). In the FfD4-related debate, Indonesia urged a clearer reaffirmation of the longstanding official development assistance benchmark of 0.7 per cent of gross national income and stronger effectiveness language (GPEDC 2024b, 5). These were reported interventions by the Indonesian delegation, not findings that Indonesia had formulated the 0.7 per cent norm or persuaded the committee to adopt a new binding target.

The same meeting recorded three Indonesian suggestions concerning GPEDC resources: a mapping of possible contributors; consideration of a revised mechanism for distributing partnership funds; and a website dashboard displaying funding sources and allocations alongside an annual funding report (GPEDC 2024b, 7). Such proposals are more specific than statements of general commitment to effective cooperation. They make it possible to ask whether an identifiable funding-transparency design entered later decisions. The minutes establish a country-attributed proposal at a definite point in time, while leaving open how the other participants evaluated its costs and feasibility.

The Steering Committee's subsequent 2025–2026 Action Plan contained engagements involving academic networks, cooperation providers and data visualisation (GPEDC 2024c, 1, 4–5). However, academic engagement appeared in the earlier programme and cannot be described as a wholly new Indonesian idea. More importantly, a monitoring-data visualisation activity is not the same object as Indonesia's suggested dashboard of the GPEDC's own financing sources and allocation flows. The 2025–2026 Action Plan does not establish that the specific proposed financial dashboard was adopted. The case therefore contains a confirmed individual initiative, a partly related collective agenda and a conspicuous limit on evidenced uptake.

Collective FfD4 Drafting and the Sevilla Outcome

FfD4 provides a sequence of texts against which institutional co-production can be examined more closely. A public GPEDC consultation invited comments and tracked changes to draft input for the FfD4 Elements Paper by 4 October 2024, with a planned consolidated submission date of 15 October (GPEDC 2024g). These dates report the consultation schedule rather than proving that a particular individual's comments were incorporated. A committee background paper dated 25 October 2024 already discussed development-effectiveness principles, aid commitments and GPEDC recognition (GPEDC 2024e, 1–5). The essential negotiation themes thus predated the publicly accessible 2025 collective amendments.

At the 28th Steering Committee meeting of 26–27 November 2024, Indonesia moderated a discussion that invited participants to identify priorities for effective development cooperation in FfD4, after which the committee approved a joint 2025–2026 Action Plan and discussed common advocacy (GPEDC 2025a, 2, 5–6). A subsequent co-chair response to the draft FfD4 outcome proposed changes on effectiveness principles, country systems and the GPEDC's monitoring role (GPEDC 2025e, 1–4). The response is an identifiable written bargaining position, but its issuer was the co-chair group. The present document trail has no authenticated contributor-specific tracked-changes record identifying which exact revisions originated with Bappenas.

On 20 May 2025, the co-chairs sent a further letter to the FfD4 co-facilitators requesting recognition of the four effectiveness principles and proposing that GPEDC voluntary monitoring form an integral part of conference follow-up (GPEDC 2025f, 1). The letter was signed by Swedish official Annika Otterstedt on behalf of all co-chairs, not by an individual Indonesian drafter (GPEDC 2025f, 2). Indonesia's participation in the co-chair arrangement is compatible with support for the submission, but the signature and group authorship do not independently establish Indonesia's responsibility for the proposed wording.

The documentary trail around FfD4 also distinguishes a co-chair group's continuing advocacy from the institutional destination of that advocacy. A public collective response carried the co-chair constituencies of Indonesia, Sweden, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and civil-society organisations, while later submissions addressed successive draft paragraphs (GPEDC 2025e). These records demonstrate an organised negotiating presence, not unanimity about every internal drafting choice. The public consultation invitation asked for tracked changes, but the underlying contributor-specific comments are not available in the accessible public record examined here. Consequently, neither a matching phrase in the final instrument nor the absence of an Indonesian signature in a particular letter warrants a conclusion about unpublished national bargaining.

The Compromiso de Sevilla dated 16 June 2025 recognised development-effectiveness principles in paragraph 35 and referred to GPEDC in paragraph 40(d)(i) as a platform whose work would be considered in a complementary relationship with the UN Development Cooperation Forum (United Nations 2025, paras. 35, 40(d)(i)). The final text is narrower than the co-chairs' request to make GPEDC monitoring an integral component of the follow-up architecture. This constitutes partial thematic or textual correspondence between a collective proposal and a multilateral outcome. Neither correspondence nor chronological succession reveals the negotiating concessions or specific national interventions that generated the final compromise.

Monitoring, Accountability and the Fifth-Round Decision

The Indonesia Country Results Brief reports a score of 0.89 on the quality of national development planning, 96 per cent alignment of new project objectives with country-owned results frameworks, and 77 per cent use of country-specific results indicators (GPEDC 2024a, 2). These are reported scores and proportions with particular measurement definitions; the 96 per cent does not mean that the same share of development finance used Indonesian administrative systems. In the public-sector delivery indicators, 46 per cent of payments used national public-financial-management systems and 14 per cent used national procurement systems, with relevant underlying financial observations referring to fiscal year 2022 (GPEDC 2024a, 3). Such differences identify a policy-and-delivery tension but cannot be assigned to a deliberate unilateral choice by the Indonesian co-chair.

The same results brief reports no established country-level targets against which the performance of development partners was collectively assessed, alongside differences in assessments of the civil-society enabling environment: government and partner perceptions were more favourable than those of civil-society organisations (GPEDC 2024a, 1–4). These are

observations about procedures and stakeholder assessments, not an experimentally isolated measure of Indonesian intention. The framework itself involves development partners, state agencies and civil-society respondents, which makes attribution to a single government's policy preference inappropriate without an additional institutional decision record.

The fifth-round proposal of September 2025 was issued jointly by the GPEDC co-chairs and envisaged another monitoring exercise to inform deliberations before the post-2030 development agenda (GPEDC 2025d, 2–3). The 30th Steering Committee on 1 October expressed broad support for continuing evidence gathering and preparing a rollout envisaged for early 2027, while Bappenas personnel moderated relevant discussions (GPEDC 2025c, 2, 4–5). At the meeting, Maharani Putri Samsu Wibowo separately called for clear and measurable goals in a prospective pact. Her intervention complicates any universal claim that Indonesia opposed measurable development-effectiveness targets as such. Committee support in 2025 is evidence of a collective forward decision, not evidence that the fifth monitoring round was implemented inside 2025.

Indonesia convened a multistakeholder Action Dialogue in Jakarta on 17 December 2025. A contemporaneous UNDP account reported more than 85 participants, while a GPEDC summary published in September 2026 reported 82 (UNDP 2025; GPEDC 2026, 1). Because the counting rule is not reconciled, the difference is retained rather than averaged. More substantively, the later summary describes technical recommendations but states that these had not become political commitments or a consensus-based action plan. This event closes the observation window with evidence of consultation and potential follow-up, not proof that all recommendations had been enacted.

Table 1 separates inherited agendas, Indonesian proposals, collective decisions and implementation statuses. Its rows do not allocate unrecorded authorship to individual co-chairs.

Table 1. Indonesian interventions, collective outputs and attribution limits, 2023–2025

Episode and prior baseline	Recorded Indonesian role or input	Observed collective response or output	Attribution limit
SCM26, December 2023; work programme pre-existing	Bappenas advocated clearer monitoring communication and moderated uptake session	Existing monitoring and dialogue activities continued	Facilitation; no uniquely Indonesian rule adoption established
SCM27, June 2024; academia already on agenda	Proposal to connect academia with South–South providers	Academic and provider activities in 2025–2026 Action Plan	Possible refinement; causal insertion not documented
SCM27, June 2024; funding architecture	Proposal for donor mapping, funding allocation reform and financial dashboard	No matching finance-transparency dashboard identified in 2025–2026 Action Plan	Individual initiative established; adoption not established
FfD4, 2024–2025; collective consultations	Indonesia moderated discussion and joined co-chair constituency	Joint draft responses and 20 May 2025 group letter	Individual draft authorship cannot be allocated
Sevilla, June 2025; co-chair monitoring request	Participation in collective request for integral follow-up monitoring	Effectiveness principles recognised; GPEDC mentioned as complementary to UN DCF	Partial text correspondence; individual causation unproven
SCM30, October 2025; planned monitoring	Bappenas moderation and measurable-indicator intervention	Steering Committee broadly supported co-chairs' fifth-round proposal	Collective future authorisation; no 2025 implementation
Jakarta Action Dialogue, December 2025	Indonesia convened cross-stakeholder meeting	Technical recommendations reported retrospectively	Not political commitments or consensus action plan

Source: GPEDC 2023a, 2023b, 2024b–e, 2025a, 2025c–f, 2026; UNDP 2025; United Nations 2025. Classification and limits are the authors' documentary comparison.

The table supports procedural leadership and attributable SCM27 proposals, but not exclusive Indonesian authorship of later collective outcomes. These distinctions guide the following interpretation.

Discussion

The documentary results support a differentiated answer to the question of Indonesia's institutional agency. Indonesia contributed to the ongoing reproduction of GPEDC procedures through convening and moderation, advanced identifiable proposals at SCM27, and participated in collective co-chair submissions. They do not, on the records currently available, demonstrate that Indonesia alone authored a new GPEDC norm or decisively determined the Sevilla wording. This is not a trivial distinction. Where institutional texts allocate final decisions to a multistakeholder committee, interpreting a chair's visibility as unilateral policy authorship would collapse proposal, bargaining, acceptance and implementation into one undifferentiated event.

Three Levels of Institutional Co-Production

At the first level, procedural co-production consists of sustaining an institutional process that predates the current office holder. The national monitoring kick-off, the Bali forum and Indonesian moderation of committee discussion supplied occasions for stakeholders to interpret and use agreed principles. At SCM29 in May 2025, Bappenas representative Sri Asfarina Murti moderated governance discussion while other co-chairs presented separate proposals (GPEDC 2025b, 3, 5–9). These activities record agenda facilitation without establishing a new rule. The terms of reference and earlier work programme make this level visible precisely because they establish what Indonesia inherited. The English School is useful here: formal secondary institutions can reproduce underlying practices of international society through routine diplomacy, even when no novel norm emerges from each meeting (Buzan 2004).

The second level is propositional co-production, in which an actor contributes a specific candidate change to a shared agenda. Indonesia's SCM27 suggestions meet this threshold because the minutes attribute to Indonesia concrete funding and knowledge-sharing proposals, not just approval of general principles. Their specificity creates testable expectations: a new source-and-allocation dashboard would require an output about partnership finances, while a South–South academic network would require a defined relationship between knowledge providers and participating institutions. An intervention at this level establishes an attributable preference or initiative; it does not show that the GPEDC collectively adopted the initiative. Conflating these two conclusions would erase the very outcome that needs explanation.

The third level is decisional co-production, in which a proposal demonstrably enters a collectively authorised output through a documented chain of deliberation and amendment. A robust case would connect a pre-intervention draft, an Indonesian textual request, a recorded bargaining response and a later agreed provision. The FfD4 episode contains the last two documents of a broad sequence but lacks the intermediary contributor-specific annotations needed to apportion authorship among four co-chairs. The 2025 fifth-round proposal similarly demonstrates joint agenda formulation followed by committee support, not exclusive Indonesian origination. Accordingly, the article can identify collective co-production with Indonesian participation while withholding the narrower assertion of individual causal authorship.

Prior Agendas and Negative Evidence

Temporal order provides an important corrective to apparent matches. Academic engagement appeared in the 2023–2024 institutional programme before Hendra Prabandani advocated linking academics to South–South providers in June 2024. The later Action Plan's academic component may be consistent with the Indonesian position, yet consistency is not evidence of insertion caused by it. A more defensible hypothesis concerns the particular connection between academic experts and South–South cooperation providers, not the invention of academic consultation itself. The available plan does not isolate the insertion of that link. This is a case where the evidence sustains reinforcement or possible refinement of an inherited programme but not creation of the broader agenda.

The financing-dashboard episode is more discriminating because the proposed object has concrete design features. The Indonesian delegation envisaged disclosure of GPEDC contributors, allocations and an annual report. The subsequent Action Plan also envisaged some monitoring visualisation, but that concerned results data rather than the organisation's own financial sources and allocations. Equating the two would create a false positive for policy adoption. Recording non-observation of the requested dashboard in the documents examined here does not establish that no such mechanism existed anywhere; it establishes that this manuscript cannot claim it as an outcome of the SCM27 intervention. Negative evidence limits the causal conclusion rather than being discarded as inconvenient.

The FfD4 texts offer a second type of disconfirming observation. The May 2025 co-chair letter sought a relatively strong role for GPEDC monitoring in conference follow-up. The Sevilla outcome gave recognition to effectiveness principles and to GPEDC but described its role as complementary to the UN Development Cooperation Forum. That change in wording matters more than the superficial fact that both texts mention the same partnership. It shows how a joint proposal can survive in narrowed form after a larger negotiation. The comparison cannot reveal whether the narrowing originated with particular negotiating states, UN facilitators or the co-chairs themselves. It thus supports an account of collective bargaining and incomplete uptake, not an account of either total Indonesian success or total failure.

A useful hierarchy of tests follows from this distinction. Documentary proof that Indonesia made a proposal is relatively direct where the minutes identify it by name. Establishing reception requires a record that the collective body engaged with its specific content. Establishing adoption requires a matching authorised instrument, not merely a similar public statement. Establishing individual causal influence requires an intervening link that rules out the plausible explanation that another participant had independently introduced or negotiated the same wording. The GPEDC material is strongest on the

first test, uneven on the second and third, and insufficient on the fourth for FfD4 authorship. A disciplined account must report this unevenness instead of converting one verified stage into an unverified chain.

Developmental Pluralism as an Observable Configuration

The English School's pluralist-solidarist spectrum provides a way to interpret the tension that survives these attribution limits. Country ownership preserves national authority to set development priorities, while common monitoring indicators, deliberative forums and civil-society participation create expectations of wider accountability. These institutions are neither purely pluralist nor automatically solidarist. Buzan (2004) treats international society as differentiated by the density of its shared understandings and institutional practices. Applied here, the relevant question is whether common rules acquire determinate reciprocal duties, not whether the vocabulary of global cooperation becomes more ambitious. A voluntary reporting process may deepen transparency while remaining weak as an enforcement mechanism.

Developmental pluralism is therefore used as a case-bounded analytical description of coexistence, not as a psychological claim about a state's concealed intentions. At the pluralist end of the observed configuration, Indonesian national plans anchor the stated objectives of development cooperation and GPEDC decisions respect country-led procedures. At the more solidarist end, the partnership invites multiple constituencies, assesses national and partner practices and seeks shared monitoring arrangements. Between these elements lie nonbinding recommendations and uneven uses of administrative systems. The resulting pattern is a form of institutional combination; the evidence does not establish that Indonesia deliberately engineered every limit or selected it as a comprehensive grand strategy.

This distinction changes the reading of quantitative monitoring results. Ninety-six per cent alignment of newly defined project objectives and 46 per cent use of national public-financial-management systems refer to different phenomena, populations and in part observation years. Fourteen per cent use of procurement systems is another delivery indicator, not the inverse of cooperation or proof that Indonesian officials rejected external oversight. The reported differences may arise from partner procedures, risk policies, administrative capacities and rules shared across jurisdictions. Because the figures cannot isolate which actor made a specific choice, they establish a coexistence of aspirational alignment and limited systems use; they do not identify a motive or the effect of Indonesia's GPEDC chairmanship (GPEDC 2024a, 2–3; Gisselquist, Justino and Vaccaro 2024).

Nor does the absence of country-level accountability targets automatically imply Indonesian opposition to measurable commitments. The GPEDC monitoring exercise records a condition of the country-level architecture that involves multiple stakeholders. Against a sweeping resistance interpretation, Maharani Putri Samsu Wibowo's 2025 statement advocated clear indicators and measurable goals in a future pact. This is a negative case for a blanket motivation claim, although it does not establish that all Indonesian actors supported any particular legally binding target. Interventions can vary across issues, institutional venues and reporting levels without constituting a unitary national preference. A credible explanation must preserve these contrasts rather than interpret every mismatch as strategic evasion.

Competing Interpretations Within the Documentary Record

Institutional continuity explains much of the sequence without requiring Indonesian authorship. GPEDC monitoring cycles, engagement with academics and co-chair consultation powers were part of previously approved plans. When officials occupy an existing office, carrying out these tasks can reflect administrative responsibility as well as substantive conviction. Collective bargaining supplies a second explanation for output language. FfD4 documents were advanced by a group representing Indonesia, Sweden, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and civil-society constituencies, while the Sevilla outcome depended on a broader intergovernmental negotiation. In this setting, similarity between an input and an adopted paragraph does not reveal each participant's share of causal influence.

This evidentiary hierarchy also guards against the temptation to portray every choice as either sovereign resistance or unconditional solidarity. A representative who calls for a clearer aid target may support thicker reciprocal expectations in one bargaining domain, while the same country's officials emphasise nationally led implementation in another. Such observations can coexist without contradiction because they concern different objects and institutional powers. The spectrum is therefore applied to specific practices and proposed duties, not to a permanent label attached to Indonesia. Any generalisation about its diplomatic identity must remain more limited than the evidence for these issue-specific actions.

A third explanation concerns the limits of the evidence itself. Official summaries select which interventions to report, and the visible public trail omits contributor-by-contributor tracked changes and some deliberative exchanges. These selection effects can make a well-documented speaker appear more influential than a participant whose interventions were not recorded, or obscure Indonesian contributions that actually occurred. The correct inference is not that those contributions were absent, but that this corpus cannot establish them. Process-tracing scholarship cautions against interpreting a compatible chronology as a decisive causal test (Collier 2011; Mahoney 2012; Beach and Pedersen 2019). The article therefore differentiates a plausible mechanism of agenda contribution from a verified mechanism of authorship.

Implications for International Society and GPEDC Governance

The case refines English School reasoning in two ways. First, a secondary institution can sustain comparatively thick routines of observation, dialogue and representation while its members retain considerable national discretion and the collective authority to authorise change. Such practices do not map onto a single linear trajectory from sovereignty to solidarity. Second, co-chair agency operates through distinct processes: institutional maintenance, issue-specific proposals and collective adoption. Only the last, when linked by an adequate evidentiary chain, supports a claim that an actor shaped a new

authorised rule. Distinguishing these processes avoids treating a position on the pluralist-solidarist spectrum as either proof of institutional weakness or evidence of deliberate strategic manipulation.

For GPEDC practice, the findings suggest a limited but concrete lesson about public accountability. Institutional reports can make clearer whether a statement is an individual national recommendation, a joint co-chair submission, a committee decision or an activity already implemented. These statuses are not interchangeable. The same distinction applies to country-level monitoring: displaying each indicator's reference year, denominator and responsible actor would prevent objective alignment from being misread as delivery-system use, and prevent a future monitoring proposal from being presented as a completed reform. These are implications of the observed documentation problems rather than claims that adopting them would, by itself, improve development outcomes.

The study also illustrates why inclusion must be assessed at the level of authorised practices, not ceremonial participation alone. Divergent perceptions of civil-society space in the Indonesia brief show that governmental and non-governmental actors may assess the same institutional environment differently. Meanwhile, the reported dispute over invitations involving Myanmar during the 2023 Busan forum shows how claims of inclusive representation can face political challenge (Progressive Voice 2023). Neither observation identifies a unilateral Indonesian invitation decision or demonstrates a particular policy effect. Together they caution against treating the appearance of an inclusive forum as a measure of distributive justice or fully shared accountability.

The interpretive conclusion is correspondingly bounded. Indonesia's interventions make it an identifiable participant in the reproduction and negotiation of GPEDC practices, and the SCM27 record establishes several substantive country-attributed proposals. The available record does not prove that Indonesia uniquely produced the wording of the most consequential multilateral documents. Developmental pluralism remains a useful name for the observed combination of country-led authority, voluntary collective reporting and selective institutional depth, provided it is not reified into an actor's verified preference or used to infer national welfare effects. The gap between documentary contribution and institutional causation remains a substantive finding rather than a shortcoming to conceal.

Conclusion

Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship in 2023–2025 combined visible institutional leadership with a more limited documentary record of rule-making influence. Indonesia facilitated monitoring and steering discussions, advanced identifiable proposals on South–South academic engagement, aid-effectiveness language and GPEDC financing, and participated in joint co-chair advocacy. These findings answer the research question by identifying concrete contributions to how the institution operated and what it discussed. They do not justify attributing every subsequent collective outcome to Indonesia as its individual author.

A comparison of earlier programmes, Indonesian interventions and later documents reveals three different outcomes. Some activities continued work already authorised before the Indonesian proposals; others remained recorded suggestions without confirmed adoption in the available plans; and the FfD4 process produced collective submissions followed by a Sevilla text that recognised GPEDC more narrowly than the co-chairs had requested. The fifth monitoring round received committee support but lay beyond the study's implementation period. Institutional co-production is thus supported at procedural and collective levels, while claims of exclusive Indonesian norm creation require stronger evidence than is presently available.

The theoretical contribution is to describe developmental pluralism as a specific coexistence of sovereign development ownership, voluntary international assessment and shared but incompletely specified accountability. In this configuration, secondary institutions can reproduce international society practices without ensuring a transition toward binding solidarist obligations. The concept identifies what the documentary record shows, not a demonstrated inner strategy of particular officials. It remains open to revision if new negotiating records establish stronger authorship links or more demanding collectively accepted rules.

The findings also clarify the difference between descriptive and causal contributions. A source that identifies a named Indonesian intervention justifies recognising that intervention as part of the historical record. A source that reports an agreed committee plan establishes a collective decision. Only an evidentiary bridge between those events can show that the specific proposal changed the authorised outcome. Preserving these levels of certainty makes the analysis more informative: it recognises meaningful diplomacy without confusing political visibility with normative authorship, and it leaves the interpretation open to stronger evidence rather than presenting an unresolved link as a settled achievement.

The practical implication is primarily one of documentary clarity. Reporting practices that separate a national proposal from committee approval, final wording and implementation allow researchers and participants to recognise substantive contributions without overclaiming institutional transformation. Equally, country-level monitoring should identify which actors and reporting years belong to each indicator, particularly when alignment and use of national financial systems are compared. These are bounded implications for the interpretation and communication of GPEDC processes rather than predictions of improved development outcomes.

The analysis is limited to the available public documentary record and the examined scholarly literature. In particular, complete contributor-specific draft histories, private deliberation notes and verified implementation follow-ups for several

proposals are not available. These limits prevent an exclusive causal attribution to Indonesia and constrain the case's wider generalisability. Subsequent documentary or interview-based research could compare proposed and final paragraphs across successive co-chair teams, examine which negotiators introduced specific amendments and assess whether monitoring commitments subsequently became operational. Until such links are established, the warranted conclusion is one of documented participation, specific proposals and bounded institutional co-production.

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